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CASENOTE; DIETZ V. BOULDIN: TESTING THE LIMITS OF A
DISTRICT COURT’S LIMITED INHERENT POWER
Erik Anderson
“It is better that the present plaintiff should suffer an inconvenience than
to head down this murky path.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The power of our courts to wield certain implied powers “must
necessarily result to our [c]ourts of justice from the nature of their
institution.”2 Dietz v. Bouldin3 is the story of how a common Montana
traffic accident reached the highest court in the land by questioning the
extent of this necessary power.4 The case specifically raised the question
of whether a federal district court could recall and re-empanel an already
excused and discharged jury. In a 6–2 decision, the United States Supreme
Court chose efficiency over prudence and modernity over convention by
holding a federal judge does wield such power.5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case read like the bread and butter of many
Montana practitioners. Rocky Dietz had the unfortunate luck of driving
through a Bozeman, Montana intersection at the same moment Hillary
Bouldin made the unfortunate mistake of running a red light.6 Dietz
suffered injuries in the crash, of course, and promptly sought a regimen of
physical therapy and steroid injections.7 Staying on script, Dietz sued
Bouldin for negligence in Montana district court.8 Bouldin removed the
case to federal court, where Bouldin admitted fault and stipulated to
medical expenses in the amount of $10,136.9 The only remaining issue for
the jury was whether Dietz was entitled to further damages.10
The jury threw a wrench in the well-oiled machine when it sent
out a note during deliberations asking: “Has the $10,136 medical expenses
been paid; and if so, by whom?”11 The jury apparently did not understand
it was required to return a verdict at least as large as the stipulated amount.
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The court, with approval by counsel, responded that the answer the jurors
sought was not relevant to their verdict.12 The jury ultimately returned a
verdict in Dietz’s favor, but for $0 in damages.13 Thereafter, the judge
thanked the jurors and ordered them “discharged,” and “free to go.”14
Moments later, when the judge realized his mistake, he instructed
the clerk to corral the jurors back into the courtroom. He summoned
counsel to his chambers, where he informed them that he had “just stopped
the jury from leaving the building” after realizing that the verdict was not
“legally possible in view of stipulated damages.”15 In fact, one juror had
already left the courtroom to retrieve a hotel receipt.16 Over opposition
from Deitz’s attorney, the court decided to re-empanel the jury to
deliberate anew and reach a proper verdict.17 The judge cited concerns
over the time and money that would be wasted if a new trial was ordered.18
The jury subsequently returned a verdict for Deitz in the amount of
$15,000 in damages.19
On appeal, a unanimous Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that reempanelment was proper so long as no jurors were exposed to “outside
influences.”20 Recognizing a split among circuits, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to “resolve confusion…on whether and
when a federal district court has the authority to recall a jury after
discharging it.”21
III. MAJORITY HOLDING
A. Scope of Inherent Power
The Court began its analysis by describing the traditional extent
of a federal district court’s inherent power. Power to hear a motion in
limine or dismiss for forum non conveniens were two examples given of
“inherent powers that are governed not by rule or statute but by the control
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”22 However, Dietz argued
the trial court erred by finding that an inherent power existed where one
did not and could not exist.23 But the Court employed a two-part test to
determine the power was within the limits inherently vested in a federal
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district court.24 First, the Court examined whether the purported power to
re-empanel was “a reasonable response to the problems and needs
confronting the court’s fair administration of justice.”25 Second, the Court
considered whether the power was contrary to any express grant or
limitation on the district court by rule or statute.26 Both inquiries resulted
in the Court’s conclusion that a district court does have a limited inherent
power to recall a jury by rescinding a discharge order.27 In addition,
analogous cases were relied upon to demonstrate the current reach of
inherent district court power, including the inherent power to rescind
orders at any point prior to final judgment in a civil case,28 to revoke a bail
order,29 to efficiently manage its dockets and courtrooms,30 and to dismiss
cases for failure to prosecute.31 According to the Court, the common thread
among these cases is the district courts’ inherent power to further “Rule
1’s paramount command.”32
Although the Court found the inherent power to re-empanel a jury
existed, it tempered its holding by emphasizing that this power was not
appropriate for use at every opportunity.33 Other vital interests such as the
fair administration of justice dictated restraint.34 In this sense, the Court
was cognizant of the potential for taint when a jury is re-empaneled.35
B. Determining the Extent of Prejudice
The Court developed a multifactor test to determine whether “any
suggestion of prejudice” has occurred.36 First, a court should look to the
length of the delay between discharge and recall.37 While providing no
definitive timing requirements, the Court noted that “even a few minutes
could be too long depending on the case.38 Second, a judge should
determine whether the jurors spoke with anyone about the case during the
discharge.39 Here the Court emphasized that access to smartphones and
mobile devices by jurors was potentially more dangerous than talking with
24
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those in the courtroom, stating that “[p]rejudice can come through a
whisper or a byte.”40 Third, a judge should consider the reaction which
results from a verdict, as emotional outbursts from people inside the
courtroom could cause jurors to reconsider their decision.41
Deitz further argued that the common law demanded a categorical
bar on re-empaneling a jury, going so far as to cite the ancient English case
credited with establishing the finality of discharge.42 However, the Court
swept this argument aside, holding that any common law rule against reempanelment was outdated and “unhelpful to understanding modern civil
trial practice.”43 Many common law practices to prevent prejudice have
long since been abandoned in the quest for efficiency, such as strict jury
sequestration,44 or as demonstrated by the move to a harmless-error
standard.45 Thus, the Court found the necessities of the modern world and
our devotion to efficiency sufficient consolation for its retreat from
tradition.
IV. JUSTICE THOMAS’S DISSENT
Justice Thomas, while acknowledging Holmes’s famous quip that
a rule of law should not stand simply because “it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV,”46 insisted that, in fact, old rules often last through the ages
“because wisdom underlies them.”47 In his dissent, which was joined by
Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas suggests that more weight should have
been given to the potential prejudice liberated jurors may return with to a
re-empaneled jury.48 Justice Thomas is especially skeptical whether any
acquired prejudice would even be detectable to the astute trial judge, and
he raises further concerns about burdening judges with yet another
ambiguous, multifactor test.49 In his view, not only is the multifactor test
vague and unworkable, it will only lead to more litigation,50 which will in
turn lead to new disagreements among the circuits, until finally the
Supreme Court will “be called on again to sort it out.”51 As a result, Justice
Thomas thinks the common law bright-line rule requiring a new trial is
more appropriate.52 Not only would it make up for inefficiencies in excess
litigation, it could also positively influence district court behavior by
40
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requiring a judge act with greater care and certainty before discharging a
jury.53
V. ANALYSIS
As the dissent points out, the Court’s departure from the common
law has the potential to create more problems than solutions. Instead of
settling on a safe, unambiguous, and well-recognized rule, the Court
determined that prejudice was best calculated through an exhaustive and
untested formula employed by each trial judge. This result fails to
acknowledge centuries of common law concerns that have been raised
over tainted juries and continues the worrisome trend of expanding lower
courts’ inherent power.
A. Constitutionality of Inherent Judicial Power
The majority admits that any action by a federal court cannot be
“contrary to any express grant of or limitation on the district court’s power
contained in a rule or statute.”54 Further, the Court correctly states that a
district judge only has the power to instruct the jury “at any time before
the jury is discharged.”55 Thus, because the jury was discharged, the only
option for the court was to use its perceived inherent powers to instruct the
jury to return and deliberate anew.
While the dissent rightfully focuses on the potential for
prejudice,56 a preliminary concern should be whether the continued use of
these “beneficial” inherent judicial powers is even constitutional. The
majority correctly states that the Supreme Court has never specifically
delineated the extent of a federal district court’s inherent power.57 Like
most judicial concepts in American law, inherent judicial power is the
result of long-standing English procedure.58 Prior to the early twentieth
century and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, inherent
power was the basis for almost all procedural management of cases.59 In
this sense, the Court rightfully concludes district courts have retained some
of their inherent power in spite of the Federal Rules.60 However, tension
arises when a court, as here, seeks to flex “beneficial” inherent powers
rather than “indispensable” or “necessary” inherent powers.61 Indeed, as
53
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Professor Pushaw points out, the Supreme Court has frequently paid lip
service to the principle that “only the least possible power adequate to the
end proposed” should be employed, while at the same time acquiescing in
an ever broader interpretation of lower court inherent powers.62
In Deitz, the Court’s focus on efficiency blinds it to the short
constitutional leash which has historically bound inherent judicial power.
When the Court first analyzed the power of inferior federal courts
following the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court held that certain implied
powers naturally exist alongside those enumerated in the Judiciary Act.63
But these inherent powers exist because they are “necessary to the exercise
of all other powers vested in the judiciary.”64
Some on the Court have previously questioned the broad reading
of these “natural” and “necessary” limits. For instance, in addition to
joining the dissent in Deitz, Justice Kennedy has previously remarked that
“[i]nherent powers are the exception, not the rule, and their assertion
requires special justification in each case.”65 Similarly, inherent powers
have been described as only those “necessary to permit the courts to
function.”66 In Deitz, the Court gives short shrift to any semblance of
justification by quickly concluding that re-empanelment is a “reasonable
response to a specific problem,”67 and therefore completely appropriate.
But this reasoning misses the point, as previous decisions have routinely
emphasized that the powers only exist to allow lower courts the ability to
“protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their
traditional responsibilities.”68 In this regard, courts have veered
substantially off course from this limited conception of inherent power.
Most notably, courts have gone so far as to use their perceived power to
compel attorney representation in civil proceedings.69 While not nearly as
expansive as compelled representation, re-empaneling jurors is simply one
more link in the growing “limited” powers leash, allowing for broader and
more far-reaching results, while at the same time emboldening federal
judges to continue pushing the limits of their “limited” inherent power.
B. Actual or Perceived Prejudice
While the majority rule gives judges considerable freedom in
determining the extent of potential prejudice received by a jury, the dissent
rightfully describes the test as a source of confusion which will inevitably

62
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lead to more questions than answers.70 For instance, what constitutes “any
suggestion”71 of prejudice? “Prejudice” is defined by Black’s Law
Dictionary as “the harm resulting from a fact-trier’s being exposed to
evidence that is persuasive but inadmissible…or that so arouses the
emotions that calm and logical reasoning is abandoned.”72 Accordingly,
any whisper from the gallery regarding the case or access to modern
devices, as the Court points out,73 could easily satisfy the definition of
“prejudice.” In this regard, the Court ignored the method historically taken
by courts to limit its effect. The historic “better safe than sorry” approach
can be traced back as far as Loveday’s Case in 1608.74 There, following
an incorrect verdict by the jury, it was held that the court “shall award a
venire facias de novo, to try the said issue by others.”75
In addition to brushing aside long standing precedent such as
Loveday, the Court disregarded the effect that a re-empaneled jury could
have on the public’s trust in our impartial jury model. As Justice Thomas
points out, “a litigant who suddenly finds himself on the losing end of a
materially different verdict [after the jury is re-empaneled] may be left to
wonder what may have happened in the interval between the jury’s
discharge and its new verdict.”76 Even if prejudice isn’t a factor in a reempaneled jury’s new deliberations, the lingering doubt alone should be
sufficient to ward against it. “When we allow the desire to reduce court
congestion to justify the sacrifice of substantial rights,” warned Justice
Black, “we attempt to promote speed in adjudication, which is desirable,
at the expense of justice, which is indispensable to any court system
worthy of its name.”77
VI. CONCLUSION
While modern case management certainly requires discriminate
use of time-consuming practices whose purpose has long since been
forgotten, those practices which are still relevant should be left
undisturbed. More importantly, practices which potentially infringe on the
tripartite powers of government, while convenient and efficient, should be
viewed with a suspicious eye more exacting than that given by the Court
in Dietz, lest we continue down Justice Thomas’s “murky path.”78
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